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Abstract. This article investigates the effects of social trust, both direct and mediated – via internal 
and external efficacy – on different forms of political participation in post-communist Lithuania. The 
relationship between social trust and participation features prominently in the social capital and civic 
culture literature, but little empirical evidence exists that supports it, especially in post-communist 
democracies. We use the Lithuanian National Elections Study 2012 to test our hypotheses and replicate 
our analysis with the European Social Survey waves of 2014 and 2016. Our results show that social 
trust increases turnout, because it is related to a sense of external efficacy, which in turn enhances the 
likelihood that people vote. There is, however, no association between social trust and being involved 
in other institutionalised politics, namely, working for a political party. Interestingly, we find a posi-
tive indirect effect for non-institutionalised political participation: social trust increases external ef-
ficacy, which in turn enhances protest behaviour. Overall, however, social trust does not lead to more 
protesting, because the former is at the same time positively related to political trust, which seems to 
decrease, rather than increase non-institutionalised participation. In sum, our findings demonstrate that 
explanations for political participation based on the core element of social capital – social trust – work 
out differently for different forms of political participation. 
Key words: social trust; voting, political participation; political efficacy; post-communism; Lithuania, 
Lithuanian National Elections Study, European Social Survey
Introduction
Almost two decades ago, the ground-breaking study of Howard (2003) underlined the conven-
tional wisdom that citizens in Central and Eastern European (hereafter – CEE) democracies are 
less likely to engage in civil society practices than people from other post-authoritarian countries, 
and especially, mature Western democracies. More recent studies suggest that there is a consider-
able revival of civil society in the post-communist region which is demonstrated, for instance, by 
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re-emerging mass protests in Hungary, Romania, Ukraine, Slovakia and Poland (Ekiert and Kubik, 
2017; Foa and Ekiert, 2017; Ekman et al., 2016; Jacobsson and Saxonberg, 2013). Yet, despite 
the positive signs of recovery of post-communist societies, participation in both electoral and 
non-electoral realms still remains relatively low in most CEE countries as noted in various recent 
studies (e.g. Kostelka, 2014; Huber and Montag, 2020; Hooghe and Quintelier, 2014; Bäck and 
Christensen, 2016; Vráblíková, 2013; Karp and Milazzo, 2015). Why, after thirty years of political 
freedom, would that be the case? 
Using the Lithuanian case as an example, we argue that political participation stems, at least 
partly, from trusting social relationships that, in turn, stimulate political efficacy. Lithuania is a 
typical post-communist case, in the sense that despite the substantial institutional and economic 
development since the collapse of communism, political participation levels are still considerably 
low. In fact, as we will show later, the levels are even relatively low compared to other post-
communist-countries (Gaidytė, 2015). Moreover, post-communist countries, including Lithuania, 
are characterised as societies that inherited a huge social trust deficit, which is more pronounced 
if we compare these countries with other post-authoritarian countries, let alone mature democra-
cies (Horne, 2014). This observation is our starting point why it is necessary to analyse the rela-
tion between social trust and political participation.1 Do social trusters in Lithuania participate 
in politics more actively than others? If so, why do they do so? And those who trust people less, 
do they participate less and why so? Put differently, what is the underlying causal chain between 
social trust and political participation? We particularly focus on the mediating effects between 
social trust and political participation, namely, via internal and external efficacy, as they are argu-
ably the most important motivators to participate in politics (Verba et al., 1995). Our research 
focus is placed within a broader context of the post-communist developments. Addressing the 
relationship between social trust and political participation in Lithuania, we seek to provide a 
better understanding of civil society and political activism in the CEE countries. More specifically, 
we contribute to our knowledge about the determinants of individual choices to participate in 
politics in two ways.
First, the necessity of our study lies in the observation that there are conflicting findings on 
how social trust affects political participation, especially in post-communist societies. Are the 
Western-driven theories of social capital also applicable in Eastern Europe? A few empirical 
studies provide evidence that social trust and some forms of political participation in the post-
communist context are positively related (Bădescu et al., 2004; van Deth et al. 2002; Armingeon 
2007; Sedláčková and Šafr, 2009; Letki, 2003). However, to the best of our knowledge, the existing 
findings are limited to the direct effect of social trust on political participation. What is missing 
in such studies, and what this article addresses, is that we are not only interested in the direct 
effect (if any) of social trust on political participation, but also in the possible mediation of this 
relationship by political efficacy. To support our arguments, we rely on the political psychology 
literature about the effects of social motives on cooperation (Kerr and Harris 1996; Kerr 1996). 
We scrutinise these mechanisms of mediation, because while it is commonly assumed and em-
pirically supported that cooperative motives determine a sense of efficacy in Western societies 
1  In this article, we use the terms “generalised trust” and “social trust” interchangeably.
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(e.g. Van Ingen and Van der Meer, 2015), we yet do not know if this assertion extends to post-
communist countries. 
Second, in line with Hooghe and Marien (2013), we distinguish between three main types of 
political participation, namely, voting and other forms of institutionalised and non-institutionalised 
participation. Although admitting that voting belongs to the array of institutionalised forms of 
participation, for methodological and theoretical reasons we distinguish these forms. We do so, 
because voting is a very particular form of institutionalised politics, as it is the most frequently 
used and the most accepted among the population (Verba et al 1995). Merging both forms of 
institutionalised political participation in one variable would attenuate other activities than voting. 
Moreover, we assume that social trust might affect different forms of participation differently. In 
contrast, most previous studies only focus on one particular type of participation, such as voting 
(Kostelka, 2014) or demonstrating (Vráblíková, 2013). 
The article is structured as follows. First, we discuss the theoretical background of the relation-
ship between political participation and social trust, and political efficacy as a mediator. By doing 
so, we derive a number of testable hypotheses. Second, we describe our research design, data 
and measurements we use to test the hypotheses. This section also includes a brief clarification of 
our case selection (Lithuania). Subsequently, we present the results of our empirical analysis. We 
conclude with a discussion about the implications of our findings and the shortages of our study. 
Theoretical background
We focus on the generalised notion of social trust, or so-called “impersonal”, “thin” trust. By doing 
so, we make a distinction between generalised and particularised trust. Generalised trust is defined 
as trust in fellow citizens with whom  bonds may be direct and indirect, whereas particularised 
trust refers to trust in “known”, particular people, like family members, neighbours, or people 
“that are like me” – of the same ethnicity, religion, etc. (Newton and Zmerli, 2011). Referring to 
the discussion about different types of trust, Fukuyama (1995) proposes the concept of the radius 
of trust, which encompasses the circle of people among whom cooperative norms are operative. 
As Delhey et al. (2011) observe, “with respect to civic cooperation the radius of trust is important 
because the wider it is, the more inclusive is the circle of cooperation”. Hence, generalised trust 
expresses a wide radius of perceived trustees in whom the truster is ready to vest his/her trust.
The social capital literature argues that people with high levels of generalised trust ‘are all-
round good citizens’ (Putnam, 2000, 137). Uslaner (2002) emphasizes the moral imperative of 
social trust. It has a bridging power, and lays a foundation of peoples’ solidarity and common-
ness (Uslaner, 2002; Seligman, 1997). It is therefore considered a social tissue of a society and a 
fundamental component of human actions (Sztompka, 1999). This perception of trust is essential 
to Durkheim’s (1983 [1997]) notion of “collective conscience” – a specific type of common moral 
beliefs that allow for social order and lead to social and economic integration (“solidarity”). Dur-
kheim believed that trust is a ground on which collective conscience is built, ensuring social order 
by putting moral constraints on individuals’ actions (Misztal, 1996, 46).
Various theories suggest that social trust is desirable for democracy, because it promotes a 
democratic political culture and reduces fractionalization of a society (Inglehart 1997; Paxton 
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2007; Putnam 1993). It encourages tolerance for pluralism and a variety of lifestyles, which is 
inevitable for the implementation of fundamental human rights and freedoms in democratic 
regimes (Misztal, 1996; Sztompka, 1999; Newton, 2007; Uslaner, 2002; Mishler and Rose, 2005). 
Moreover, social trust allows for peaceful conflict resolution, compromise and consensus, because 
when people trust each other, they are committed to the same democratic values and principles 
(Žiliukaitė, 2005, 87). This insight is key when talking about the consolidation of democracy in 
post-communist countries. 
The perceived collective obligations instilled in social trust connect it to political participa-
tion, a sine qua non of democratic political systems (Armingeon, 2007). Different traditions of 
democratic theory emphasize the value of political participation (Pateman, 1970; Barber, 2003). 
Barber (2003, 145) suggests that only through participation people can become citizens who can 
enjoy freedom, equality, and social justice, because these are common goods which can only be 
generated through politics. Through participation, politicians can be hold accountable for their 
decisions, and will thus be more responsive towards their electorate.
To sum up the social capital and civic culture literature, the conventional perception is that both 
social trust and political participation are desirable for democracy, but scholars debate whether 
there is a direct empirical relationship between these two concepts. Basically, two different claims 
can be distinguished. On the one hand, the advocates of social capital theories assume that citizens 
need a basic level of social trust before they will embark on various forms of political participa-
tion. The underlying reason of this argument is that social trust facilitates coordinated actions and 
cooperation, which eventually “spills over” to the political realm (Gambetta, 1988; Putnam, 1993, 
2000; Norris, 2002b; Van Deth et al., 2002). The more trustful an individual, the more s/he tends 
to cooperate and is exposed by civic norms, including norms about participation. When citizens 
participate in small-scale civic associations, they are taught habits of cooperation and thus are 
socialised into larger political involvement – the process is conceptualised as “social spiral” with 
social trust and political action at both ends (Putnam, 1993, 2000; Newton, 2007; Van der Meer 
and Van Ingen, 2009). These assumptions are first of all applicable to voting and other forms of 
institutionalised participation, such as party membership, campaigning, contacting politicians, 
and doing voluntary work for a political party.
Moreover, some authors argue that non-institutionalised participation, which includes a range 
of less formalised ways citizens make their voice heard, like signing petitions, demonstrating, strik-
ing and boycotting, relies even to a greater extent on social trust than institutionalised participa-
tion. Social trust is particularly important for facilitating mobilization, as demonstrating and other 
forms of elite-challenging participation are usually more risky. As Benson and Rochon (2004) point 
out, taking part in a demonstration may sometimes entail arrest and prosecution, depending on 
the political context and the atmosphere (for instance, whether some of the protesters become 
violent, how the police reacts, etc.). Social trust reduces the expected risks of participation. It 
leads to optimistic estimates about the likelihood of success, because it allows to form expecta-
tions about the actions of others (Dasgupta, 1988). People engage in collective actions because 
they trust others will do so as well. Klandermans (1984) argues that the odds of the success of a 
protest action are directly related to how many people participate. 
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On the other hand, some authors claim that social trust means that citizens will withdraw from 
some forms of political participation. This alternative approach posits that social trust may work 
as “double-edged sword”, meaning that trusting people can remain passive, because they believe 
that others can be trusted to participate (and “do the job”) for them (Pattie et al., 2003, 458). 
The scholarly literature distinguishes different associations between social trust and the different 
modes of political participation, for instance, empirically supporting the negative link between 
social trust and working for political parties/campaigns (Hooghe and Marien, 2013; Hooghe and 
Quintelier, 2014; Van der Meer and Van Ingen, 2009). This could be explained by the competitive 
political nature and strategic interests an individual possess (Imbrasaitė, 2008). However, drawing 
on the social capital literature, we expect that the relationship between social trust and political 
participation, irrespective of its mode, follows the same logic as with civic participation. Accord-
ingly, we formulate the following three hypotheses:
H 1-3: Social trust will be positively associated with voting (H1), participation in other forms of 
institutionalised politics (H2), and participation in non-institutionalised politics (H3).
It is evident that the impact of social trust on participation cannot be investigated in an isolated 
manner (cf. Kriesi and Westholm, 2007). In order to understand how trust impacts participation, 
we need to delve into the underlying mechanism of this relationship. We find the Civic Voluntarism 
Model, developed by Verba, Schlozman and Brady (1995), helpful here. This Model emphasises 
the importance of different resources for political participation. A major resource that determines 
individual’s willingness to participate in politics is political efficacy, defined as ‘the feeling that 
individual political action does have or can have an impact upon the political process’ (Campbell 
et al., 1954, 187). Political efficacy has been studied extensively since the 1950s and its positive 
effect on political activity is deep-rooted in empirical research (Abramson, 1983; Rosenstone and 
Hansen, 1993, Verba et al., 1995; Morrell, 2005; Van der Meer and Van Ingen, 2009). In line with 
Lane (1959), we distinguish between internal and external political efficacy. Internal efficacy in-
dicates a person’s competence and his perceived capabilities to take part in the political process, 
whereas external efficacy indicates a person’s perceived responsiveness of the political system 
(Niemi et al., 1991). The reason why this distinction is important, is that it might contribute to dif-
ferent types of political participation differently. Internal efficacy is assumed to foster participation 
in both institutionalised (including voting) and non-institutionalised politics, because it refers to 
individual’s awareness of political issues and points towards the ways how to influence politics 
(Gamson, 1968, 48; Sheerin, 2007). Individuals with higher levels of external efficacy are more 
inclined to embark on (only) traditional political activities, because they feel that their voice is 
heard by the political system (Hooghe and Marien, 2013).
The scholarship dealing with how social trust and political efficacy both directly affect political 
participation is mainly confound within the fields of political science and sociology, and does not 
provide more in-depth explanations how these concepts could be related. Borrowing from the field 
of political and social psychology, we elaborate on the psychological mechanisms of the mediation 
effects of efficacy. Kerr (1996, 210-211) proposes that “a variable that can be established as an 
antecedent of cooperation might, in fact, also be an antecedent of feelings of efficacy and, could 
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either partially or wholly exert its effect on cooperation indirectly”. This argument stems from 
the so-called transformation hypothesis stating that those with more cooperative social motives 
attach greater weight to others’ outcomes (Kerr and Harris, 1996). In other words, social trust as 
a cooperative social motif would translate into a sense of efficacy, and efficacy in turn enhances 
cooperation. The connection between social trust and internal efficacy is most straightforward. 
While trusting, people are more inclined to socialize with each other, thus they more often acquire 
political knowledge and information in general about the subjects to be acted on and the methods 
to employ such actions. We do agree that distrustful persons could also gain political information, 
but trust in others widens the perspectives of political community (Anderson, 2010; Milner 2002; 
Kornberg and Clarke, 1992). 
The relationship between social trust and external political efficacy is more intuitive and less 
theoretically developed, but there are several hints in the social/political psychology literature. 
Anderson (2010: 61) claims that individuals who are more trusting, are also more successful in 
building relationships with others and in influencing the opinions of fellow citizens. Following this 
logic, such individuals might be encouraged to believe that s/he can also be influential in the politi-
cal arena. A closely related explanation is that a trusting person feels that s/he can have a control, 
in the sense that others would act in a predictable (not harmful) way (Kornberg and Clarke, 1992). 
Trust suppresses fear and thus enables for an action, including political one (Sztompka, 1999). 
Hence, trusting individuals have good reasons to believe that his/her action might be potentially 
effective. We formulate the following hypotheses:
H 4-6: External and internal political efficacy play a mediating role between social trust and par-
ticipation in voting (H4A-B), other institutionalised (H5A-B) and non-institutionalised (H6A-B) 
forms of politics.
If these hypotheses hold true, the findings would add to the theoretical arguments about the 
consequences of social trust and social capital in general, or, paraphrasing Putnam, it would help 
to explain the linkages within the “social spiral” of trust and participation. The mediation effect 
would demonstrate that social resources, at the one end of social spiral, could be transformed 
into individual political resources, at the other end of the spiral. Having formulated our hypoth-
eses, in the following section we shortly overview the results of previous studies that relate to 
our hypotheses. 
Prior results on the relation between social trust and participation
The currently available empirical findings on how social trust affects political participation is quite 
ambiguous. Almost two decades ago, van Deth (2001) found no correlation between social trust 
and voter turnout in Western European societies. Consequently, he concluded that social trust as 
a collective good does not seem to be relevant for the decision to spend a few minutes at a ballot 
box once every few years. But more recent research finds a positive relationship. For instance, 
both Hooghe and Marien (2013), using European Social Survey (ESS) 2006 data, and Armingeon 
(2007), using Citizenship, Involvement, Democracy (CID) data gathered in 12 European democ-
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racies, reported a weak, although positive correlation between social trust and voter turnout. 
Similarly, using the ESS 2008 data, Bäck and Christensen (2016) find a positive significant effect 
of generalised trust on voting. 
The relationship of social trust with other institutionalised forms of participation (than voting) 
in available studies is, in contrast to what we have hypothesised, mostly negative (Hooghe and 
Marien, 2013; Hooghe and Quintelier, 2014; Armingeon, 2007; van der Meer and van Ingen, 2009; 
Bäck and Christensen, 2016). The authors notice that social trust especially correlates negatively 
with contacting politicians, being a member of a political party, and working for political parties 
and campaigns. In a similar vein, Uslaner and Brown (2005) claim that generalised trusters are less 
likely to attend political meetings or rallies, but rather choose more communal or charity-related 
participation. Drawing on this evidence, it makes even more sense to keep voting and other forms 
of institutionalised participation separate in our analyses. 
When turning to non-institutionalised forms of political participation, Kaase (1999) finds a 
positive relation between social trust and participation in boycotts and street demonstrations in 
nine Western European countries, using the 1981–1996 European/World Values Survey. Similarly, 
using the ESS data, a positive effect of social trust on protesting and other non-institutionalised 
forms of participation is found in the analyses of Hooghe and Marien (2013) and Bäck and Chris-
tensen (2016). And the aforementioned study of Uslaner and Brown (2005) observes a positive 
effect of social trust on signing petitions (on the aggregated level). In Asian countries, Kim (2014) 
found that generalised trust is mainly positively associated with non-institutionalised participa-
tion: political boycotting and petitioning. 
The communist legacy might have a profound effect on the linkage between social trust and 
political participation. Three main reasons are singled out in the literature (Markova, 2004; How-
ard, 2003; Kornai et al., 2004). First, post-communist societies inherited distrust in organisations 
and people who join organisations. Second, people in this region are often disappointed in the 
transformation and in democracy, which deters them from participating, regardless of the social 
resources they possess (citizens rather choose the freedom “to not participate”). Third, the so-
cietal structure of a post-communist society relies on family and friendship-based networks that 
replace second-level associations that, according to Putnam, breed particularised and, eventually, 
generalised trust. 
In post-communist societies, the relationship between social trust and political participation 
is yet empirically underresearched, apart from a few notable exceptions (Bernhagen and Marsh 
2007; Letki 2003; Uslaner 2004; Armingeon 2007; Sedláčková, and Šafr 2009). The most extensive 
studies, comparison-wise, are of Armigeon (2007) and Bernhagen and Marsh (2007), who find 
no significant differences in terms of the relationship between social trust and different forms of 
political participation in Eastern and Western European societies. The latter study observes that 
social trust has a positive impact on protest participation, both in Eastern and Western European 
countries (Bernhagen and Marsh, 2007, 63). Armigeon (2007, 379) finds that social trust is positively 
related to voting, but negatively to contacting (other relations are not significant). Letki (2003, 
20) concludes that social trust significantly influences partisanship and voting in Eastern Europe. 
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Research design
Case selection 
As we already pointed out, our study focuses on Lithuania. Different aspects of political participa-
tion and social capital in Lithuania have been discussed and analysed by many scholars (Ramonaitė, 
2006, 2007; Žiliukaitė et al., 2006; Matonytė, 2004; Matonytė et al., 2017; Imbrasaitė, 2004; 
Bartuškaitė ir Žilys, 2011; Genys, 2018; Riekašius, 2011; Kavolis, 1997). The scholarship widely 
acknowledges that Lithuanians have less social resources and are less politically engaged than 
citizens in Western democracies (cf. Genys, 2018). According to the European Values Study, par-
ticipation in demonstrations in Lithuania dropped dramatically from 34.0 in 1990 to 7.7 percent in 
2008. The European Social Survey indicates that in the waves between 2012 and 2016 only around 
2 percent of the respondents participated in lawful demonstrations, 6.6 percent signed a petition 
(2016), while boycotting slightly increased from 3.7 percent in 2014 to 7.2 percent in 2016. In the 
most recent Lithuanian parliamentary elections (in 2016), the voter turnout of the parliamentary 
elections (first round) was as low as 51 percent (53% in 2012). This is one the lowest scores in the 
region (and represents one of the strongest declines since 1990), and these alarming figures are 
only comparable with the relatively low levels in Poland, Romania and Bulgaria (data from the 
European Election Database).
Two factors are in common between Lithuania and other young democracies in the CEE 
region and make Lithuania an exemplary case. On the one hand, civil society is characterised by 
the negative experience of a totalitarian communist regime (Aidukaitė, 2016; Sztompka, 1999; 
Paldam and Svendsen, 2001). Due to the restrictions of civic and political rights, Lithuanians used 
to invest their time mostly in private circles, rather than embarking on civic or political actions. 
Whereas in Western democracies people participate in political life because of their needs and 
desires, people in Lithuania, as in many other post-communist societies, tend to assume that their 
social needs are already fulfilled in family-based circles (Imbrasaitė, 2004). 
On the other hand, there are hardly any political-institutional barriers to participate anymore. 
From an institutional perspective, most post-communist countries are consolidated democra-
cies. The transition that followed by the rapid globalisation and Europeanisation has opened up 
opportunities to be exposed by wider social circles and, in turn, be involved in various types of 
political participation. 
Data and measurements 
The data for studying the hypotheses come from the Lithuanian National Elections Study (hereafter: 
LNES), which is a post-election survey carried out in 2012, November – December.2 Additionally, 
we also replicate our analysis and test the hypotheses using ESS data, merging its waves 7 (2014) 
and 8 (2016). The findings of this replication are shown and discussed in the appendix.3 For the 
2  The Lithuanian National Election Study 2012 was carried out by Ltd. “Baltic Surveys” on order of the Institute 
of International Relations and Political Science, Vilnius University, Principal Investigator: prof. Ainė Ramonaitė. We 
could not use the more recent LNES 2016, because the key variable – social trust – was not included.
3  Unfortunately, we could not explore the newer data of ESS (2018), because it was not yet available at the 
time of writing.
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sake of readability, if not indicated otherwise, the reported operationalisation and results here in 
the main text are from the LNES. 
The LNES offers a rare opportunity to examine the relationship between social trust and 
participation in depth: it provides extensive information on political activities, social and political 
attitudes, as well as political skills (not all these measures were included in the ESS). In total 1500 
residents in Lithuania of 18 years and older were interviewed in 161 localities. The sample was 
selected in a stratified random way. Each district was represented proportionally to its residents’ 
share to the Lithuanian population. The sample includes residents regardless of their citizenship, 
nationality, religion, language or legal status. Face-to-face interviews at the respondents’ homes 
were performed. The response rate was 61%.4 
Dependent variables
Voting is gauged by the question: Did you vote on the national parliamentary elections day, 
13th of September, 2012? Answers: yes=1; no=0. 
Involvement in other forms of institutionalised political participation is tapped by the fol-
lowing question: Did you work in a political party or participated in its activity during the last 12 
months? (Yes/No). Unfortunately, we did not have other items that would measure this type of 
participation. For instance, party membership is not asked in both the LNES and the ESS.
Participation in non-institutionalised politics is measured by 5 indicators: 1) Participated in 
a civic action/movement, which was not related with charity in the last 12 months; 2) Signed a 
petition (not via internet) in the last 12 months; 3) Took part in a demonstration or picket in the 
last 12 months; 4) Participated in a strike in the last 12 months; 5) Bought or boycotted certain 
products because of moral or political reasons in the last 12 months; Answer categories: 1 = yes, 
0 = no. The distribution of the summed variable is highly skewed: the majority of the respondents 
did not participate in any movement action. Therefore, we decided to apply a dichotomised 
scoring: We give a score of 1 to participants who participated at least in one movement politics 
activity, and a score of 0 to the non-participants. The ESS only includes 4 out of these 5 indicators 
of non-institutionalised participation, thus our replication slightly differs in this respect (see more 
details in the appendix). 
Independent variables
Social trust is measured with a standard question “Generally speaking, would you say that most 
people can be trusted or you can’t be too careful?” Measurement: 0 = you can’t be too careful; 
10 = most people can be trusted. In the ESS, this variable is operationalised with two additional 
questions (cf. Zmerli and Newton, 2008). 
We measure external political efficacy as perceived government’s responsiveness, which is 
captured with the question “Do average citizens have an influence on the important decisions in 
the country?” Measurement: 0 = No influence, 10 = Very big influence.
Internal political efficacy is tapped by four items, measuring agreement or disagreement 
4  Survey Field Report, 2012.
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with the following statements: 1) “I consider myself to be well qualified to participate in politics”; 
2) “I feel I have a good understanding of the most important political issues facing our country” 
3) “I feel that I could do as good job in public office as most other people”; 4) “I think that I am 
better informed about politics and governing than most people”. Answers ranged from Disagree 
strongly (1) to Strongly agree (5). Including all respondents with at least one non-missing value 
on the items, the general score for each individual is a mean of the items (Cronbach’s α = 0.91).5
The question wording and answer categories of all other variables (controls) are presented in 
Table A1 in the appendix. We included several control variables because links between variables 
can, of course, be spurious – social trust, political efficacy, and political participation might be just 
correlated due to common source variables, for instance, socio-economic resources (Bernhagen 
and Marsh, 2007). In addition to social status, financial situation, and level of education, we also 
control for religious attendance, trade union participation and engagement in what Putnam calls 
‘secondary organizations’ (we call this social embeddedness). We also control for the two socio-
demographic characteristics, age and gender, since these factors influence political participation 
(Verba et al., 1995).
Finally, we control for political trust, political knowledge (political information), and political 
interest. It is important to isolate the impact of social trust and political efficacy by controlling for 
these attitudinal factors. The existing literature suggest that efficacy and political knowledge are 
two fundamentally different concepts that need to be disentangled, but one might hypothesize 
that individuals who lack political knowledge and interest are less likely to experience (internal) 
political efficacy (Reichert, 2016). Therefore, we control for these potential confouders. Political 
trust is included as control variable, since it might emerge as possible alternative explanation 
for the link between social trust and political engagement. The effect of social trust needs to be 
empirically isolated from the impact of political trust on participation. 
Descriptives 
Before examining the hypotheses, we scrutinise the descriptives of the key variables. Table 1 shows 
that 65% of the respondents reported to have voted in the 2012 elections (in ESS 2014–2016 this 
is 57%6). The levels of participation in both institutionalised and non-institutionalised forms of 
politics are considerably lower. Only six percent of the Lithuanians were  active in party politics 
activities. Overall, at least one of the movement actions were taken only by 15% (in ESS 2014–2016 
this is 4% and 13%, respectively). Thus, except for voting, a vast majority  participate in neither 
institutionalised nor non-institutionalised politics at all.
Social trust is generally rated below the midpoint (the mean is 4.13, on a 0–10 scale), sug-
gesting that most respondents think that they cannot be “too careful” with other people. In ESS 
5  In ESS, external efficacy is measured with two questions: “How much would you say the political system in 
[country] allows people like you to have a say in what the government does?” and “How much would you say that 
the political system in [country] allows people like you to have an influence on politics?”. Internal efficacy is mea-
sured with two questions: “How able do you think you are to take an active role in a group involved with political 
issues?” and “How confident are you in your own ability to participate in politics?”. 
6  This considerable difference with the ESS could be explained by the fact that the LNES is an explicit election 
survey and the non-response among the non-voters could be therefore higher. 
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2014–2016, the mean of this item is 4.90). When it comes to external and internal political efficacy, 
the descriptives show a big gap between these two variables: perceived external efficacy of the 
respondents is considerably lower (2.46 on a 0–10 scale) than internal efficacy (2.49 on a 1–5 
scale). Put differently, the belief that the government is responsive to citizens’ demands is more 
than twice as low as the confidence in one’s own ability to participate in politics. 
Table 1. Descriptive statistics of the dependent and independent variables
Variable Mean SD Min Max N
Voting
Voted in the last elections (2012) 0.65 0.48 0 1 1486
Institutionalised politics participation (other than voting)
Worked in a political party or participated in its activity during 
the last 12 months 0.06 0.23 0 1 1491
Non-institutionalised politics participation 0.15 0.36 0 1 1471
Participated in a civic action 0.05 0.23 0 1 1485
Signed petition 0.09 0.29 0 1 1485
Participated in a demonstration 0.04 0.20 0 1 1487
Participated in a strike 0.01 0.12 0 1 1484
Boycotted certain products 0.02 0.16 0 1 1484
Social trust 4.13 2.21 0 10 1480
External efficacy 
Do average citizens have an influence on the important deci-
sions in the country 2.46 2.13 0 10 1459
Internal efficacy 2.49 0.91 1 5 1441
I consider myself to be well qualified to participate in politics 2.49 1.05 1 5 1412
I feel I have a good understanding about the most important 
political issues facing our country 2.74 1.09 1 5 1427
I feel that I could do as good job in public office as most as 
other people 2.37 1.02 1 5 1390
I think that I am better informed about politics and governing 
than most people 2.33 0.99 1 5 1399
*Missing values (don’t know, no answer) were recoded into 1 if respondents answered “no” on another question, 
namely whether they had participated in religious community activities. Source: LNES 2012. 
To assess to what extent the variables are related to each other, we consider the Pearson’s 
correlation coefficients (Table 2). The results show that voting and participation in institutionalised 
politics positively correlates with most key variables, thus supporting the traditional paradigm of 
explaining conventional participation: civic values of a good citizen endorses his/her activity in 
institutional politics. Yet, the correlation between social trust and voting and working for a politi-
cal party is rather weak (Pearson’s r = 0.10 and 0.03), which is likewise the case in ESS 2014–2016 
(Pearson’s r = 0.07 and 0.08). Non-institutionalised political participation is most significantly 
correlated with social embeddedness (0.29), internal efficacy (0.22) and political interest (0.22). 
As for social trust, it most firmly goes along with external efficacy (0.30) and political trust (0.27), 
but, surprisingly, only weakly correlates with embeddedness in formal social networks (0.09). 
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Table 2. Pearson’s correlations 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16)
(1) Voting x
(2) Inst. polit. 
part. .158 x
(3) Non-inst. 
p. part. .166 .195 x
(4) Social 
trust .095 .025 .040 x
(5) External 
efficacy .219 .075 .130 .300 x
(7) Internal 
efficacy .246 .248 .215 .133 .263 x
(6) Political 
trust .200 .124 .060 .272 .349 .187 x
(8) Political 
interest .442 .248 .217 .084 .187 .419 .189 x
(9) Polit. 
information .282 .109 .140 .140 .071 .264 .140 .311 x
(10) Embed-
dedness .208 .407 .292 .086 .139 .242 .171 .256 .178 x
(11) Trade 
union .056 .150 .212 .041 .073 .149 .069 .092 .040 .208 x
(12) Religious 
attend. .202 .028 .026 .062 .110 .022 .131 .170 .085 .093 -.021 x
(13) Age .180 .018 -.056 -.095 -.097 -.036 .034 .243 .123 .028 -.019 .314 x
(14) Gender .030 -.019 -.043 -.016 .001 .135 .060 .095 .090 -.059 -.036 -.255 -.060 x
(15) Educa-
tion .232 .144 .114 .057 .134 .332 .022 .251 .123 .183 .138 -.041 -.145 -.103 x
(16) Financial 
sit. .069 .130 .034 .123 .185 .297 .151 .156 .112 .193 .128 -.034 -.254 .040 .285 x
(17) Social 
status .116 .070
* .056 .201 .268 .302 .179 .153 .118 .144 .083 -.002 -.263 .016 .323 .559
Note: significance (p<0.01) in bold.
Source: LNES 2012. 
Results 
We performed three logistic regressions for each form of political participation.7 Table 3 displays 
the results for voting. Model 1 only includes socio-demographic variables and social trust. It dem-
onstrates that social trust increases the chance that citizens take part in the ballot. The tentative 
answer to our first research question is thus that there is a positive relationship between social 
trust and political participation. We have reported the odds ratios and the changes in probabilities 
attributable to changes in the independent variable. OR reports the change in the odds ratio as-
sociated with one unit increase in the predictor variable. Hence, our results show that one unit 
increase in the amount of social trust (on a scale from 0 to 10) increases the odds of voting by 
7  Examination of multicollinearity statistics indicated no concerns with respect to multicollinearity for all anal-
yses.
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a factor of 1.11 (which hardly differs from what the ESS 2014–2016 shows: 1.08). The depicted 
predicted probabilities are more easily interpretable: citizens with the lowest level of social trust 
have a much lower propensity (60%) to go to the polls compared with citizens who have the high-
est level of trust (81%), holding all other variables constant. This is a considerable effect. If we 
could raise the average level of social trust in the Lithuanian electorate by just one unit (from the 
actual figure of 4.13 to 5.13), we predict that the turnout, which is currently 65.0 per cent, would 
increase to 67.3 per cent.8 To conclude, hypothesis 1 (Social trust has a positive direct effect on 
voting) is tentatively confirmed by the results. 
Table 3. Binary logistic regression analysis of voting 





x=min x=max x=min x=max
Constant 0.068**** 0.027 0.018**** 0.009
Age 1.029**** 0.004 0.502 0.875 1.010** 0.005 0.686 0.808
Gender 1.057 0.137 0.695 0.706 0.888 0.138 0.754 0.732
Education 1.158**** 0.022 0.394 0.872 1.100**** 0.024 0.558 0.853
Social status 1.071 0.048 0.636 0.764 0.993 0.049 0.749 0.737
Financial  
situation 1.027 0.092 0.690 0.713 0.817
** 0.083 0.807 0.650
Social trust 1.108**** 0.033 0.603 0.810 0.996 0.035 0.747 0.739
External efficacy 1.191**** 0.048 0.652 0.916
Internal efficacy 1.121 0.108 0.709 0.794
Political trust 1.094** 0.045 0.670 0.833
Political  
information 1.227
**** 0.072 0.616 0.784
Political interest 2.837**** 0.339 0.467 0.952
Embeddedness 1.904*** 0.392 0.714 0.900
Union  
membership 0.775 0.354 0.745 0.694
Religious  
attendance 1.119
** 0.057 0.682 0.808
Nagelkerke 
pseudo R2 0.142 0.343
N 1241 1241
Note: *p < 0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01, ****p<0.001 (two-tailed tests).
Source: LNES 2012.
Model 2 adds external and internal political efficacy, and additional control variables, to 
examine why social trusters tend to vote more often. We find that external efficacy significantly 
increases the chance to go voting. This (predicted) chance is considerably boosted from 65% to 
92% if we compare people with the least and most external efficacy. As conventional theories 
on political participation would assert, our results show furthermore that political interest and 
8  The calculation is as follows: the probability to vote is 0.65, the odds is therefore 0.65/0.35 = 1.86 to 1. Mul-
tiplication by 1.11 yields the odds of 2.06, which is similar to a probability of 2.06/3.06 = 67.3%.
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political information are positively related with voting. The impact of social embeddedness is also 
significant; for people who are strongly involved in both a civic association and the local community, 
the probability to go voting is no less than 90%, which is almost 20 percentage points higher than 
those who score zero on social embeddedness (71%). Taken all these variables into account, the 
influence of social trust becomes insignificant. 
We also tested the mediation effects of external and internal efficacy in a more sophisticated 
way by using the PROCESS macro for SPSS developed by Hayes (2013).9 The results (depicted in 
Table 4) show that hypothesis 4A (External political efficacy plays a mediating role between social 
trust and voting) is empirically supported. At the same time, however, there is no empirical sup-
port for hypothesis 4B (Internal political efficacy plays a mediating role between social trust and 
voting). Internal political efficacy has no significant effect on the propensity to vote. 
Table 4. Binary logistic regressions with parallel multiple mediation analyses examining indirect effects of 
social trust on voting, institutionalised, and non-institutionalised participation via external efficacy and in-
ternal efficacy 
95% confidence interval
B coefficient SE (B) Lower Upper
Voting (n=1249)
Direct effect -0.0044 0.0353 -0.0735 0.0648
Indirect total effect 0.0341 0.0094 0.0175 0.0544
Indirect effect via external efficacy 0.0329 0.0094 0.0171 0.0533
Indirect effect via internal efficacy 0.0012 0.0019 -0.0010 0.0083
Participation in institutionalised politics (n=1251)
Direct effect -0.0870 0.0755 -0.2350 0.0610
Indirect total effect 0.0004 0.0202 -0.0443 0.0366
Indirect effect via external efficacy -0.0084 0.0225 -0.0529 0.0238
Indirect effect via internal efficacy 0.0079 0.0004 -0.0097 0.0279
Participation in non-institutionalised politics (n=1243)
Direct effect -0.0269 0.0430 -0.1112 0.0574
Indirect total effect 0.0243 0.0101 0.0049 0.0452
Indirect effect via external efficacy 0.0213 0.0096 0.0029 0.0412
Indirect effect via internal efficacy 0.0053 0.0036 -0.0029 0.0122
Notes: Bold figures represent significant effects (p < 0.05). Results are based on 10,000 bias-corrected bootstrap 
samples. For the statistical controls that were included, see Table 6.3. 
Source: LNES 2012.
In sum, our results demonstrate that social trust enhances electoral participation, because 
social trusters perceive the political system as more responsive, which, in turn, stimulates voting. 
Internal efficacy, however, does not mediate the relation between social trust and voting. The 
latter could be explained by the fact that we control for both political information and political 
9  This method is able to estimate models with dichotomous outcomes and more than one mediator and ad-
justs all paths for the potential influence of covariates not proposed to be mediators in the model. Thus, it allows 
to simultaneously test the direct and indirect effects of social trust via both types of efficacy on participation in one 
model, controlling for all confounders (Hayes 2013). The macro is available at Hayes’s website: http://www.afhayes.
com/introduction-to-mediation-moderation-and-conditional-process-analysis.html.
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interest; particularly the latter correlates strongly with internal efficacy. A closer inspection indeed 
reveals that if we would not control for these two variables, hypothesis 4B can be confirmed. In 
that case, the effect of internal efficacy (OR = 1.634; SE(B) = 0.080) on voting becomes substantial 
and highly significant. However, if one strictly considers political interest and political information 
as different concepts than internal efficacy that need to be controlled for, we indeed have to reject 
hypothesis 4B. Finally, we note that replication with ESS data largely confirms our conclusion (see 
appendix B for more details).
Concerning participation in institutionalised politics (in this case – working for a party), Table 
5 indicates that there is no direct effect of social trust. This refutes hypothesis H2 and instead 
confirms the argument that the competitive and conflict-based atmosphere of institutionalised 
politics is not related to cooperative attitudes in Lithuania (cf. Imbrasaitė, 2008). We obviously 
neither find support for the mediation effect of efficacy (H5A and H5B). Nevertheless, internal 
efficacy significantly increase participation in party politics activities. In sum, our findings suggest 
that involvement in institutionalised politics is driven by particular interests, rather than social 
trust and altruistic behaviour. 
Table 5. Binary logistic regression analysis of participation in institutionalised politics (other than voting)  





x=min x=max x=min x=max
Constant 0.002**** 0.001 0.0001**** 0.0002
Age 1.014* 0.008 0.031 0.075 0.989 0.010 0.020 0.010
Gender 0.899 0.223 0.048 0.044 0.620 0.198 0.019 0.012
Education 1.164**** 0.046 0.013 0.128 1.041 0.050 0.011 0.020
Social status 0.941 0.081 0.059 0.035 0.771** 0.087 0.043 0.004
Financial situation 1.811**** 0.325 0.016 0.151 1.523* 0.338 0.001 0.036
Social trust 1.031 0.060 0.041 0.055 0.917 0.069 0.021 0.009
External efficacy 0.957 0.071 0.017 0.011
Internal efficacy 2.196**** 0.468 0.005 0.095
Political trust 1.200** 0.102 0.007 0.043
Political information 1.133 0.192 0.010 0.017
Political interest 2.986**** 0.773 0.004 0.103
Embeddedness 4.330**** 0.858 0.011 0.167
Union membership 1.264 0.629 0.015 0.019
Religious attendance 0.981 0.102 0.016 0.014
Nagelkerke pseudo R2 0.167 0.437
N 1251 1251
Note: *p < 0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01, ****p<0.001 (two-tailed tests).
Source: LNES 2012.
Our analysis replicated with ESS data (see appendix B)  yields exactly the same conclusion 
in terms of which of our key variables have positive significant effects on working for a party. 
Likewise, internal efficacy enhances participation, whereas external efficacy does not. We find an 
interesting difference, however, because the ESS analysis supports hypothesis 4B (Internal political 
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efficacy plays a mediating role between social trust and participation in party politics). The reason 
for this difference is not that the effect of internal political efficacy on the propensity to be active 
for a party is smaller (the effect in the LNES (Exp(B)=2.20) is considerably stronger than in the 
ESS (Exp(B)=1.22), but can be explained by the fact that social trust is more strongly related with 
internal efficacy in the ESS sample than in the LNES sample (LNES: r=0.13; ESS: r=0.20).
Finally, the analysis of participation in non-institutionalised (Table 6) indicates that there is 
no effect of social trust on this type of political activities (the total effect is insignificant). Hence, 
we have to reject H3 (Social trust has a positive effect on participation in non-institutionalised 
politics). This finding leads us to consider that people are recruited to protest on the basis of 
particularised trust (strong ties between people we know), rather than generalised social trust 
(week ties between strangers). This was also observed at the beginning of the independence 
movement in 1987 (Ramonaitė, 2011). We will elaborate more on this point in the discussion 
section. 
Table 6. Binary logistic regression analysis of participation in non-institutionalised politics 





x=min x=max x=min x=max
Constant 0.101**** 0.479 0.087**** 0.050
Age 0.995 0.005 0.168 0.130 0.975**** 0.006 0.215 0.048
Gender 0.853 0.137 0.161 0.140 0.690* 0.133 0.135 0.097
Education 1.101**** 0.026 0.071 0.264 1.002 0.028 0.113 0.118
Social status 0.997 0.055 0.152 0.149 0.930 0.059 0.151 0.085
Financial situation 0.938 0.105 0.166 0.133 0.683*** 0.087 0.206 0.054
Social trust 1.051 0.039 0.126 0.191 0.973 0.042 0.127 0.100
External efficacy 1.119** 0.050 0.090 0.233
Internal efficacy 1.347** 0.161 0.076 0.214
Political trust 0.947 0.048 0.139 0.086
Political information 1.197** 0.102 0.072 0.137
Political interest 2.003**** 0.287 0.056 0.322
Embeddedness 2.546**** 0.377 0.095 0.405
Union membership 5.423**** 1.984 0.109 0.400
Religious attendance 1.059 0.069 0.101 0.137
Nagelkerke pseudo R2 0.030 0.255
N 1243 1243
Note: *p < 0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01, ****p<0.001 (two-tailed tests). 
Source: LNES 2012.
When we include other variables in our analysis (Model 2), the results show that both internal 
and external efficacy have a positive effect on engagement in protest behaviour. They both spur 
social movement activities: the predicted percentage of people who engage in non-institutionalised 
politics increases from 8% to 21%, if we compare people who score lowest and highest on internal 
efficacy. Similarly, people who perceive the least external efficacy have a much lower chance (9%) 
to be politically active than people who perceive the most external efficacy (23%). Contrary to 
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the results of voting, internal efficacy has an independent (significant) effect on protests actions, 
even if we control for political information and political interest. As one might expect, we find 
that political interest and information are positively associated with the likelihood to engage in 
non-institutionalised activities. 
The effect of social trust remains insignificant in Model 2. The mediation analysis using the 
above-mentioned macro of Hayes (Table 5) reveals that there is an indirect effect of social trust 
on non-institutionalised participation, via external efficacy. This indirect path results from the fact 
that social trust is a strong predictor of external efficacy, and, in its turn, external efficacy fosters 
participation. H6A is therefore corroborated.
It is worth asking why then, overall, social trust does not stimulate protesting: this is due to 
the fact that it  significantly increases both external efficacy and political trust. The significant 
positive effect of external efficacy on non-institutionalised participation supports the assumption 
that disappointment in government’s responsiveness diminishes protests actions. In contrast, at 
the same time we find that political trust has a negative influence (although the effect is insignifi-
cant), indicating that the less individuals trust political institutions, the more they tend to protest 
(cf. Marchenko, 2016). Our findings importantly indicate that the conviction that politicians are 
responsive works out quite differently than the conviction that they are trustful: the former leads 
to activism, the latter might yield apathy.
Finally, our replication based on the ESS data – we refer again to the appendix B for more 
details – reveals that the total effect of social trust on protesting hardly differs between the LNES 
(Exp(B)=1.05) and the ESS (Exp(B)=1.06), and this effect is significant in the ESS (because this sample 
is larger). Moreover, we observe a similar intriguing pattern as we just have described above: the 
indirect effects show that social trust both increases and decreases participation at the same 
time, because it stimulates political trust and external efficacy, which have contradicting effects. 
Conclusion and discussion 
This paper investigated the direct and mediating effects of social trust on political participation. 
In the literature, competing claims have been put forward with regard to the relation between 
social trust and various forms of political participation. While some authors claim that social trust 
enhances all forms of political participation, others assume that social trust has no direct association 
with political action. In this article, we conduct a comprehensive analysis of this relation, based 
on arguments about the consequences of social trust and social capital in general. Paraphrasing 
Putnam, we theorised on the linkages within the “social spiral” and argued that social resources 
(i.e. social trust), at the one end of social spiral, could be transformed into individual political re-
sources (i.e. politial efficacy), at the other end of the spiral. We used the 2012 Lithuanian National 
Elections Study to test our hypotheses and we replicated the analysis with the ESS 2014–2016 data. 
Our results showed a positive association between social trust and voter turnout. Moreover, 
we found that social trust translates into a sense of external political efficacy, which, in turn, boosts 
electoral participation. In this regard we can conclude that the lack of social trust by a majority of 
the Lithuanian population leads to lower levels of electoral participation, since it diminishes one’s 
perceived responsiveness of the political system. Interestingly enough, however, we found that 
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internal efficacy has no significant additional effect on the propensity to vote. This could be due 
to the fact that we also controlled for two factors that are conceptually distinct, yet empirically 
related, namely political interest and political knowledge. 
For other forms of institutionalised participation we studied, namely, working for a political 
party or participating in party activities, no relation with social trust could be observed. That is 
perhaps not surprising, keeping in mind that the existing empirical research done in other Euro-
pean countries found similar results (Hooghe and Marien, 2013; Hooghe and Quintelier. 2014; 
Armingeon, 2007; van der Meer and van Ingen, 2009; Bäck and Christensen, 2016). In line with 
these studies, our findings suggest that those who are engaged in party activities rely on other 
individual resources than social trust in fellow citizens, and in this regard this form of participation 
is different from voting. 
Furthermore, we found no association between social trust and non-institutionalised forms 
of political participation. Yet, the same as with voting, we find that social trust indeed increases 
a sense of external efficacy, which in turn leads to participation in non-institutionalised politics. 
That we however find no overall association between protesting and social trust, is due to the 
fact that the latter is not only positively associated with external efficacy, but also with political 
trust. And our results suggest that people who are efficacious engage more in protest behaviour, 
whereas people who have more trust in politics engage less. Taken everything into account, social 
trust does not stimulate non-institutionalised participation, at least not in this particular dataset 
of 2012. At the same time, this finding underlines the value of our mediation approach in order 
to provide the causal mechanism between social trust and political participation.
A shortcoming of our study is that we only investigated one particular national context, namely 
Lithuania, at one specific point in time. Although our analysis replicated with other, newer data 
confirmed our main conclusions, it revealed also a few differences. More importantly, it is difficult 
to say how well our findings represent similar patterns in other post-communist democracies. Given 
the fact that there are similarities between these countries, our findings may be generalisable 
beyond the case at hand. Our study could provide general lessons for the whole post-communist 
region for two reasons. 
First, to our surprise, we shed doubt on the claim that social trust is a resource that brings 
people to demonstrations, unlike in many Western European countries (for instance, Kaase, 1999; 
Bäck and Christensen, 2016). There are a few arguments to explain this. The first argument rests 
on the observation that in less democratic countries, social trust functions as a guarantee for 
social order (Rossteutscher, 2010). It means that in such societies, socially trusting people are 
also politically trusting (and vice versa), and thus, are not willing to embark on elite-challenging 
political activities. In more mature, Western democracies, social trust and political trust are less 
strongly connected (Newton, 2007). The second argument refers to the type of protests citizens 
embark on. The literature observes that social trust, as a resource to seek for common good, 
leads to participation in demonstrations that deal with post-materialist (universalistic) issues, 
in contrast to the so-called “bread and butter” (particularistic) demonstrations (Verhulst and 
Walgrave, 2009). Presumably, the former ones are more prevalent in older democracies, and the 
latter more in newer democracies. Unfortunately, our questionnaire did not specify the issues of 
the non-institutionalised political actions. The third argument stresses the role of civic organisa-
59
Teodora Gaidytė, Jasper Muis. 
Examining political participation in Lithuania: The direct and mediated effects of social trust
tions/associations in involvement in protest behaviour. Apparently, people who belong to such 
secondary organisations are not more often generalised trusters, which could be because of the 
hierarchical, competitive, non-democratic nature (cf. Letki 2004) of these organisations or, because 
of a self-selection effect. Regarding the latter, as Karakoc (2013) observes, less economically privi-
leged people prefer associations whose members are alike or choose not to participate at all. As 
a result, these people have less chances to increase interactions with different others, they are 
less likely to feel as a part of the community and, in turn, they tend to not cherish a feeling of 
generalised social trust (Uslaner, 2002).
The second broader lesson of our study is that the two concepts of political efficacy and political 
trust should be kept separately – the conviction that one can influence politics is different than the 
belief that it is necessary to do so. Gamson (1968) already stressed this a long time ago. We derive 
this from our finding that external efficacy is positively associated with non-institutionalised par-
ticipation (i.e. protesting), while political trust is not. This observation is worth scrutinising further, 
because it seems that external efficacy and political trust work in contradicting directions. Future 
studies could investigate whether there are any interaction effects between the two concepts in 
explaining why people embark on a protest action or not.
To conclude, although formal institutions in the post-communist region are displaying attributes 
of consolidated democracies, citizens generally feel distant from political life and are unaware of 
means to influence politics. In addition to political-institutional structures, we have demonstrated 
the role of lacking cooperative social attitudes and political skills to explain why citizens are not 
willing to use their political rights for which they have struggled so hard. This paradox of political 
apathy will probably still be hunting the post-communist region in the years to come. 
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Appendix A
Table A1. Sociodemographics, Dependent and Independent Variables, Controls 
Variable Question Wording Answer Categories Mean SD N
Sociodemographics
Sex Are you . . . ? 0 = Female
1 = Male
0.50 0.50 1500
Age In which year were you born? Year 46.41 17.50 1500
Education What is the highest level of educa-
tion that you completed?
0 = Not completed primary
1= Primary
2 = Vocational (without completing 
basic)
3 = Basic (including youth schools)
4 = Vocational (completing basic)
5 = Vocational (after completing basic)
6 = Vocational after completing basic, 
when the studies of vocational lasted 
two or more years
7 = Secondary (including gymnasium 
schools)
8 = Special secondary (including high 
technical schools)
9 = Vocational (after completing sec-
ondary)
10 = Further education or special sec-
ondary obtained after basic
11 = Further education or special sec-
ondary obtained after secondary
12 = Higher vocational (non-university 
degree)
13 = Higher (university degree), Bach-
elor degree
14 = Higher (university degree), Ex-
tramular studies
15 = Higher (university degree), Master 
degree






Which of these statements most 
accurately describes financial situa-
tion of your family? 
1 = We don‘t have enough money even 
for food
2 = We have money only for food, but 
not enough for clothes
3 = We have money only for food and 
clothes, but not for more expensive 
goods
4 = We can afford some expensive 
things, for instance, TV set, refrigerator




What social status are you consid-
ered to be in?
Scale 1–10:
1 = The lowest position
10 = The highest position
5.22 1.84 1452
Dependent variables
Voting Did you vote on the national par-
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Did you work in a political party or 
participated in its activity during 








Total: 0.15 0.36 1471
Have you…?
…participated in a civic action/
movement, which was not related 





…signed a petition (not via inter-




…took part in a demonstration or 









…bought or boycotted certain 
products because of moral or polit-





Social trust Generally speaking, would you say 
that most people can be trusted or 
you can‘t be too careful?
Scale 0–10, left-right: 
0 = You can‘t be too careful.




Do you agree with the following 
statements? 
Total: 2.49 0.91 1441
I consider myself to be well quali-
fied to participate in politics
1 = Disagree strongly
2 = Disagree
3 = Neither agree, nor disagree
4 = Agree
5 = Strongly agree 
2.49 1.05 1412
I feel I have a good understanding 
about the most important political 
issues facing our country
1 = Disagree strongly
2 = Disagree
3 = Neither agree, nor disagree
4 = Agree
5 = Strongly agree 
2.74 1.09 1427
I feel that I could do as good job 
in public office as most as other 
people
1 = Disagree strongly
2 = Disagree
3 = Neither agree, nor disagree
4 = Agree
5 = Strongly agree 
2.37 1.02 1390
I think that I am better informed 
about politics and governing than 
most people
1 = Disagree strongly
2 = Disagree
3 = Neither agree, nor disagree
4 = Agree





Do average citizens have an influ-
ence on the important decisions in 
the country
0 = No influence.
10 = Very big influence. 
2.46 2.13 1459
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Variable Question Wording Answer Categories Mean SD N
Control variables
Political trust Do you trust in the following insti-
tutions?
Scale 0–10, left-right                     Total: 3.90 1.97 1481
Country’s parliament 0 = No trust at all.
10 = Complete trust.
2.97 2.42 1457
Courts 0 = No trust at all.
10 = Complete trust.
3.69 2.64 1451
The police 0 = No trust at all.
10 = Complete trust.
5.31 2.69 1458
Political parties 0 = No trust at all.
10 = Complete trust.
3.24 2.27 1433
Government 0 = No trust at all.
10 = Complete trust.
3.62 2.50 1447
President 0 = No trust at all.




How interested would you say you 
are in politics?
1= Not interested at all
2 = Hardly interested 
3 = Interested




Please indicate is it true or false: 0 = Not correct answer            Total: 
1= Correct answer (4 in total)
2.81 1.29 1500
President, according to the Consti-
tutional law, can give an order to 
the judges what decision to make 
in one or another case
1 = True 
2 = False
Lithuanian Parliament is composed 
of 181 members
1 = True 
2 = False
Mayors are elected directly in 
Lithuania
1 = True / 2 = False
In the PM office of Andrius Kubili-
us, the post of the minister of MFA 
was held by Audronius Ažubalis




Have you…? Total: 0.23 0.51 1484
Worked in organization or associa-




Participated in the activities of 







Have you participated in trade 







How often attend religious services 
apart from special occasions (wed-
ding, funeral, christening?)
1 = Never, Almost never*
2 = Less than once a year
3 = Only on special holy days
4 = Once a month
5 = Once a week
6 = More than once a week
7 = Every day
2.59 1.60 1500
*This category also includes those respondents who refused to answer or did not know the answer. 
Source: LNES 2012
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Appendix B: robustness check (cross-validation with the ESS data)
In order to assess the robustness of our findings, we tested our hypotheses also with different data. In their fourfold 
typology of replication, Freese and Peterson (2017) call this form ‘repeatability’ (doing the same analyses on new 
data), although our attempt also somewhat resembles ‘generalisation’ (doing different analyses on new data), because 
we could not rely on using exactly the same variables and the investigated time periods differ. 
We relied on the European Social Survey (ESS) and merged rounds 7 and 8 (2014 and 2016). Unfortunately, we 
could not use round 6 (2012), because two key variables in our study – internal and external efficacy – were missing 
and only included in later rounds. Like our main analysis reported in the article, we selected only the respondents 
of 18 year or older. To make our robustness checks as comparable as possible to our main analysis, we constructed 
a series of equivalent variables. The ESS variables we used for the robustness check are depicted in the table below. 
Unfortunately, two important variables in the LNES 2012 (“perceived social status” and “political information”) 
are not available in the ESS. Furthermore, the items of internal and external political efficacy have different scales 
between the two ESS rounds. To combine both waves, we rescaled the 11-point scale (ESS 2014) into the 5-point 
scale used in ESS 2016 as follows: 0–1=1; 2–3=2; 4–6=3; 7–8=4; 9–10=5. Finally, we note that ESS includes an ad-
ditional item that could measure institutionalised political participation, namely ‘contacting politicians’ (variable 
name: contplt). To ensure comparability, we did not include this item – besides, it is debatable whether contacting 
politicians is actually a valid measurement of institutionalised political participation since it is sometimes associated 
more with clientelism. 
Table B1. Variables used in the replication analyses
Variable ESS variable name Remarks
Sex gndr Value 2 is recoded into 0.
Age agea
Education edlvdlt
Perceived financial situation hincfel Reverse coded
Perceived social status -- NA 
Generalized trust ppltrst
Political trust trstprl, trstlgl, trstplc, trstplt, trstprt
Internal political efficacy actrolga, cptppola (2016)
actrolg, cptppol (2014)
ESS2014 recoded: 0-1=1; 2-3=2; 4-6=3; 
7-8=4; 9-10=5.
External political efficacy psppsgva, psppipla (2016)
psppsgv, psppipl (2014)
ESS2014 recoded: 0-1=1; 2-3=2; 4-6=3; 
7-8=4; 9-10=5.
Political interest polintr Reverse coded
Political information -- NA
Social embeddedness wrkorg 
Trade union activities mbtru Values 2, 3, 7, 8 are recoded into 0.
Religious attendance rlgatnd Reverse coded; Values 77 and 88 are 
recoded into 1.
Voting vote yes=1; no=0.
Institutionalised political 
participation





Value 1 if at least one of the items has 
the score 1, value 0 if none of the items 
has the score 1.
Source: LNES 2012.
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The results of the logistic regressions are reported in Tables B2–B4. Additionally, we also tested the mediation 
effects of external and internal efficacy by using the PROCESS macro developed by Andrew Hayes. These findings are 
depicted in Table B5. To accommodate the comparison, we have also reported the findings on the analyses based 
on the LNES in the same tables. Different outcomes in terms of the significance and/or direction of the effects are 
marked in bold in the results based on the ESS datasets. 
Based on the LNES, we found that social trust enhances voting, because social trusters have more efficacy, which, 
in turn, stimulates voting. The ESS analysis largely confirms this conclusion: it shows that the total indirect effect is 
significant, which means that, taken together, both types of efficacy jointly mediate the relationship between social 
trust and voting (see Table B5). However, considering the effects of the two mediators separately, we find that the 
effect of external efficacy is not statistically significant, because the effect in the ESS (Exp(B)=1.10) is smaller than in the 
LNES (Exp(B)=1.19). The latter revealed that external efficacy has a positive significant effect on voting (see Table B2). 
This difference could perhaps be due to different measurements. In the LNES, respondents’ perceived govern-
ment’s responsiveness is captured with the question “Do average citizens have an influence on the important deci-
sions in the country?” The ESS formulation is somewhat more abstract and asks respondents how much they would 
say that “the political system in Lithuania allows people to have an influence on politics”. 
Next, Table B3 concerning institutionalised political participation (in this case – working for a party) shows that 
the ESS analysis yields largely similar outcomes in terms of which of our key variables have positive significant effects: 
embeddedness, political interest, political trust, and internal efficacy all enhance participation, whereas external 
efficacy does not. Our conclusion based on the LNES was exactly the same. 
We find an interesting difference, however, when we consider hypothesis 4B (Internal political efficacy plays a 
mediating role between social trust and participation in party politics). The ESS analysis supports this hypothesis, 
whereas the LNES analysis rejected it (see Table B5). The reason for this difference is certainly not that the effect 
of internal political efficacy on the propensity to be active for a party is smaller, because we find that the effect in 
the LNES (Exp(B)=2.20) is considerably stronger than in ESS (Exp(B)=1.22). A better explanation is that social trust 
is more strongly related with internal efficacy in the ESS sample than in the LNES sample. This is already evident 
from a simple glance at the correlation between the two variables (LNES: r=0.13; ESS: r=0.20). That also explains 
why the total effect of social trust on working for a party is significant in the ESS analysis (see model 1 in Table B3).
Finally, we consider participation in non-institutionalised politics. Overall, social trust significantly stimulates 
protesting – we did not find this effect in the LNES. Interestingly, the total effect of social trust on protesting hardly 
differs between the ESS (Exp(B)=1.06) and the LNES (Exp(B)=1.05) datasets (see model 1 in Table B4). However, this 
effect is statistically significant in the ESS data, whereas it is insignificant in the LNES. 
Furthermore, we find that internal efficacy stimulates participation: this effect of internal efficacy on protest-
ing is exactly the same in both datasets (LNES: Exp(B)=1.35; ESS: Exp(B)=1.35). The mediation analysis (see Table 
B5) shows however that the indirect effect of social trust on non-institutionalised participation via internal efficacy 
is only statistically significant in the ESS sample, as this indirect effect in the LNES is much smaller. This is for the 
same reason that we have just explained above: social trust is more strongly related with internal efficacy in the 
ESS sample than in the LNES sample.
The mediation analysis of ESS data shows that H6A is rejected – in contrast, our main findings based on the LNES 
corroborated this hypothesis. This hypothesis claimed that social trust leads to participation in non-institutionalised 
politics, because social trusters perceive more external efficacy, which in turn leads to participation. In contrast, 
based on the ESS analysis, we find that those who perceive high responsiveness are actually less inclined to partici-
pate in protests. Interestingly, at the same time we find that political trust has a positive influence (and the effect is 
significant), indicating that the more individuals trust political institutions, the more they tend to protest. 
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Remarkably, we found exactly the opposite pattern in our main analysis based on the LNES data. The only intrigu-
ing similarity is that both  variables have contradicting effects on protesting (see Table B4). It shows that concerning 
the question why people participate in non-institutionalised political activities, it is probably hard to disentangle 
the role of political trust and external efficacy. Based on both the ESS and the LNES we find a support for both the 
positive and negative effects of external efficacy (‘protesting because it is effective’ vs ‘protesting because politi-
cians don’t listen to us’), as well as a support for both the positive and negative effects of political trust (‘protesting 
because politicians will listen to us’ vs ‘protesting because it is necessary’). 
Table B2. Logistic regression analysis of voting (comparison between the ESS and the LNES)
ESS LNES
Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2
Exp (B) SE (B) Exp (B) SE (B) Exp (B) SE (B) Exp (B) SE (B)
Constant 0.030**** 0.236 0.006**** 0.288 0.068**** 0.027 0.018**** 0.009
Age 1.039**** 0.002 1.025**** 0.003 1.029**** 0.004 1.010** 0.005
Gender 1.142* 0.073 0.831** 0.086 1.057 0.137 0.888 0.138
Education 1.127**** 0.011 1.074**** 0.012 1.158**** 0.022 1.100**** 0.024
Social status -- -- -- 1.071 0.048 0.993 0.049
Financial situation 1.131*** 0.047 1.031 0.052 1.027 0.092 0.817** 0.083
Social trust 1.076**** 0.018 0.988 0.021 1.108**** 0.033 0.996 0.035
External efficacy 1.101 0.059 1.191**** 0.048
Internal efficacy 1.063 0.051 1.121 0.108
Political trust 1.143**** 0.023 1.094** 0.045
Political information -- -- 1.227**** 0.072
Political interest 2.891**** 0.062 2.837**** 0.339
Embeddedness 2.743*** 0.289 1.904*** 0.392
Union membership 1.653** 0.219 0.775 0.354
Religious attendance 1.254**** 0.035 1.119** 0.057
Nagelkerke pseudo R2 0.128 0.317 0.142 0.343
N 3685 3685 1241 1241
Note: *p < 0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01, ****p<0.001 (two-tailed tests).
Source: LNES 2012; ESS 2014 and 2016 (Lithuania).
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Table B3. Logistic regression analysis of institutionalised – other than voting – political participation (compa-
rison between the ESS and the LNES)
ESS LNES
Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2
Exp (B) SE (B) Exp (B) SE (B) Exp (B) SE (B) Exp (B) SE (B)
Constant 0.002**** 0.551 0.000**** 0.681 0.002**** 0.001 0.0001**** 0.0002
Age 0.994 0.005 0.982*** 0.007 1.014* 0.008 0.989 0.010
Gender 1.093 0.169 0.762 0.197 0.899 0.223 0.620 0.198
Education 1.219**** 0.028 1.117**** 0.030 1.164**** 0.046 1.041 0.050
Social status -- -- -- -- 0.941 0.081 0.771** 0.087
Financial situation 1.118 0.118 0.922 0.130 1.811**** 0.325 1.523* 0.338
Social trust 1.189**** 0.043 1.049 0.050 1.031 0.060 0.917 0.069
External efficacy 0.994 0.125 0.957 0.071
Internal efficacy 1.223**** 0.107 2.196**** 0.468
Political trust 1.188*** 0.055 1.200** 0.102
Political information -- -- 1.133 0.192
Political interest 2.938*** 0.127 2.986**** 0.773
Embeddedness 5.405**** 0.242 4.330**** 0.858
Union membership 0.970 0.367 1.264 0.629
Religious attendance 1.328**** 0.082 0.981 0.102
Nagelkerke pseudo R2 0.088 0.341 0.167 0.437
N 3840 3840 1251 1251
Note: *p < 0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01, ****p<0.001 (two-tailed tests).
Source: LNES 2012; ESS 2014 and 2016 (Lithuania).
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Table B4. Logistic regression analysis of non-institutionalised political participation (comparison between 
the ESS and the LNES)
ESS LNES
Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2
Exp (B) SE (B) Exp (B) SE (B) Exp (B) SE (B) Exp (B) SE (B)
Constant 0.062**** 0.303 0.032**** 0.340 0.101**** 0.479 0.087**** 0.050
Age 0.983**** 0.003 0.979**** 0.004 0.995 0.005 0.975**** 0.006
Gender 1.004 0.102 0.802* 0.114 0.853 0.137 0.690* 0.133
Education 1.169**** 0.016 1.116**** 0.017 1.101**** 0.026 1.002 0.028
Social status -- -- -- -- 0.997 0.055 0.930 0.059
Financial situation 0.980 0.068 0.854* 0.073 0.938 0.105 0.683*** 0.087
Social trust 1.058** 0.025 0.966 0.029 1.051 0.039 0.973 0.042
External efficacy 0.888 0.076 1.119** 0.050
Internal efficacy 1.354**** 0.062 1.347** 0.161
Political trust 1.163**** 0.030 0.947 0.048
Political information -- -- 1.197** 0.102
Political interest 1.537**** 0.074 2.003**** 0.287
Embeddedness 6.195**** 0.195 2.546**** 0.377
Union membership 1.452* 0.216 5.423**** 1.984
Religious attendance 1.029 0.047 1.059 0.069
Nagelkerke pseudo R2 0.083 0.208 0.030 0.255
N 3842 3842 1243 1243
Note: *p < 0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01, ****p<0.001 (two-tailed tests).
Source: LNES 2012; ESS 2014 and 2016 (Lithuania).
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Table B5. Parallel multiple mediation analyses examining indirect effects of social trust on voting, institu-
tionalised political participation, and non-institutionalised political participation via external and internal 
efficacy (comparison between the ESS and the LNES)
ESS LNES
B coefficient SE (B) B coefficient SE (B)
Voting (n=3685/1249)
Direct effect -0.0124 0.0212 -0.0044 0.0353
Indirect total effect 0.0110* 0.0044 0.0341* 0.0094
Indirect effect via external efficacy 0.0078 0.0047 0.0329* 0.0094
Indirect effect via internal efficacy 0.0032 0.0029 0.0012 0.0019
Institutionalised political participation (n=3840/1251)
Direct effect 0.0050 0.0503 -0.0870 0.0755
Indirect total effect 0.0384* 0.0101 0.0004 0.0202
Indirect effect via external efficacy 0.0046 0.0098 -0.0084 0.0225
Indirect effect via internal efficacy 0.0338* 0.0076 0.0079 0.0004
Non-institutionalised political participation (n=3842/1243)
Direct effect -0.0346 0.0287 -0.0269 0.0430
Indirect total effect 0.0059 0.0056 0.0243* 0.0101
Indirect effect via external efficacy -0.0096 0.0061 0.0213* 0.0096
Indirect effect via internal efficacy 0.0155* 0.0039 0.0053 0.0036
Notes: *p < 0.05. Results are based on 10,000 bias-corrected bootstrap samples.
For the statistical controls that were included, see Tables B2-B4.
Source: LNES 2012; ESS 2014 and 2016 (Lithuania).
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